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FOREWORD
Study 2.4, "Analysis of Space Tug Operating Techniques," was
managed by the Advanced Missions Office of the NASA Office of Manned
Space Flight. Dr. J. W. Wild was the Technical Director of this study;
day-to-day management was performed by Mr. R. R. Carley. Mr. R. E.
Kendall was The Aerospace Corporation Study Director from study initiation
until 3 April 1972. Dr. L. R. Sitney directed the Study from that date
through completion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the major portion of the work done on
Study 2.4, "Analysis of Space Tug Operating Techniques," of Contract
NASw-2301. Other tasks performed under Study 2.4 are reported in
Study 2. 3 final report and a supplemental report on Study 2. 4. These
other tasks are defined later in this section. The following tasks were
considered as potential specific study tasks for Study 2.4.
Task 1 - Impact of DOD-Unique Requirements on an
ELDO-Designed Tug
Task 2 - Utility of a Non-Autonomous DOD Tug
Task 3 - Licensing Considerations (Of an ELDO Tug)
Task 4 - Identification of Tug Subsystem Cost Drivers
Task 5 - Conceptual Design and Operation of a Payload
Retrieval Mechanism
Task 6 - Conversion of MSFC Tug Point Design to NASA/DOD
Multi-Purpose Tug Design
Task 7 - Tug Technology Requirements
Task 8 - ELDO Technology Assessment
Task 9 - Tug Refurbishment Costs
Tasks 1 and 9 were selected for first priority, the former being
limited to a review of available documentation from the ELDO Phase A
Studies, the ELDO Phase A Statement of Work and DOD OOS Studies. Par-
ticipation in the ELDO Tug Subsystem Design Reviews anticipated for July
1972 was planned by Aerospace as part of Task 1. This effort was not
expended due to cancellation of the ELDO Subsystem Review Meetings as a
result of the termination of the ELDO Tug activities. A preliminary one-
month assessment of Tug refurbishment costs was made on Task 9 utilizing
existing cost estimating relationships (CERs). The results were of
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sufficient interest to warrant an in-depth "bottoms-up" analysis of Tug
refurbishment costs. A detailed study plan was then submitted to the NASA
Technical Director and, following its approval, the "bottoms-up" analysis
was initiated. This analysis used the total remaining study manpower.
During May 1972 a NASA review of the refurbishment effort (Task 9)
resulted in the following recommendations for the remaining refurbishment
effort.
Item 1 - Improve Refurbishment Estimates and Review Design
Impacts
a. Define Tug fault detection methods for each Tug major
system.
b. Identify test points and sensors for fault isolation of each
system listed above.
c. Continue review of refurbishment man-hour estimates to
assure common base for estimates and to describe unusual
man-hour requirements.
d. Review tank insulation refurbishment approach.
e. Review auxiliary propulsion system refurbishment approach
for possible reduction in man-hour requirements.
f. Investigate new tank design approach.
g. Clarify fuel cell refurbishment estimate.
h. Summarize the refurbishment vehicle design impacts
(requirements) as determined from the refurbishment studies.
Item 2 - Establish Study Parameters to Determine Impact on Refur-
bishment of NASA/USAF Two Launch Site Concept
2
Item 3 - Refurbishment Engineering Support Requirements
a. On-site vehicle and subsystems.
b. Off-site vehicle and subsystems.
With the exception of Items la, lb, and 3, these items were accomplished
by the end of the study. Items la, lb, and 3 were addressed at the end of
the study period in a very broad sense, however, and are reported sepa-
rately in Aerospace report ATR-73(7314)-2. Item 2 was not addressed to
any depth due to the low (less than four flights per year) anticipated Tug
traffic rate from the Western Test Range (WTR).
During the FY 1972 effort, the following Tug activities were supported
jointly by Studies 2. 3 and 2.4:
1. Tug Implications of Mark I/Mark II Shuttle Program
2. ELDO Phase B Cost Estimates
and are reported as part of Study 2. 3, Aerospace report ATR-73(7313-01)-1.
This document therefore contains only the effort expended on Task 9, Tug
Refurbishment Costs.
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II. STUDY OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the refurbishment study was to establish, by a
"bottoms-up" analysis, the cost of maintaining the reusable third stage of
the Space Transportation System, viz., the Tug. Design effects and require-
ments of selected components that result from the refurbishment function
were to be identified. Also, areas requiring in-depth subsequent studies
were to be identified. The statement of work is contained in Appendix A.
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III. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NASA PROGRAMS
The Tug Refurbishment Cost Study was conducted from November 1971
to August 1972. During this same time period, the following major Tug-
related studies were also being conducted under NASA sponsorship:
Space Tug Point Design Study - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co.
(MDAC)
Space Tug Point Design Study - North American Rockwell
Space Tug Economics Study - Lockheed Missiles Space Co.
Space Tug Aerobraking Study - Boeing Aircraft Co.
Tug Operations and Payload Support Study (TOPS) - North American
Rockwell
Space Tug Launch Site Service Study - General Dynamics/Convair
Shuttle Orbital Applications and Requirements (SOAR) - MDAC
Tug refurbishment was addressed in the two Space Tug Point Design
Studies but only to the extent of Refurbishment Plans and top level prelimi-
nary cost estimates. The Space Tug Economics Study considered both
expendable and reusable Tugs. Refurbishment effort was limited to the
use of a range of refurbishment cost factors in the assessment of overall
reusable Tug operations costs. Data generated in The Aerospace Corpora-
tion Refurbishment Cost Study were used to bound the range of refurbish-
ment cost factors used in the LMSC Space Tug Economics Study. The Tug
Aerobraking Study, and TOPS and SOAR studies were design and operations
oriented, respectively, and therefore did not address the subject of refur-
bishment. The Space Tug Launch Site Service Study, which has as its
primary objective the evaluation and identification of the major ground
operations requirements and interfaces for a ground-based Tug, was
initiated in July 1972 and will address the subject of Tug refurbishment
5
operations in significant depth. The importance of additional study regarding
Tug refurbishment costs is the result of its impact on overall Tug turnaround
costs for a reusable vehicle.. This impact was identified in The Aerospace
Corporation Study 2.4 reported herein.
6
IV. METHOD OF APPROACH AND PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTIONS
A list of ground rules and assumptions were generated to cover basic
design philosophy required for a refurbishable vehicle, assumptions con-
cerning fault isolation and replacement of failed components, and the portion
of Tug ground operations considered as Tug refurbishment.
A. APPROACH
A baseline vehicle was synthesized from available data obtained from
both funded and in-house Tug/OOS studies. The vehicle was divided into the
following eleven major areas for which basic data were generated:
1. Basic Structure
2. Meteoroid Shield
3. Tug/Payload Docking Mechanism
4. Tug/Shuttle Docking Mechanism
5. Interface Panels
6. Propellant Tanks
7. Propellant Tanks Insulation System
8. Main Propulsion System
9. Auxiliary Propulsion System
10. Electrical Power
11. Avionic s
This was done by means of "Refurbishment Data Sheets" and "Refur-
bishment Operations Sheets. " The "data sheets" contain all of the pertinent
descriptive information for each of the major vehicle areas, e.g., the func-
tion of the equipment; physical characteristics, such as weight and size; an
estimate of the unit cost and maturity of the equipment; expected failure
modes and rates, where known; and an estimate of the cost to refurbish
7
the piece of equipment. The "operations sheets" describe the actual tasks
that are necessary to keep the equipment functioning properly, the frequency
at which the tasks are performed, the hardware replaced during the tasks
and an estimate of the manpower required to perform the tasks.
From the data and operations sheets, an estimate was made of the
scheduled maintenance costs for each subsystem. Next, using the informa-
tion available on subsystem mean time between failure, an estimate was made
of the subsystem maintenance costs due to random failures. The total Tug
refurbishment costs were then tabulated and the cost drivers identified.
Refurbishment design effects and requirements of selected Tug systems that
have a significant effect on refurbishment costs were identified. An assess-
ment was also made of areas that are of major concern to refurbishment
and which require subsequent in-depth studies.
The data used in this study came from many sources. Tug/OOS vehicle
contractors were surveyed for applicable information. The NASA Tug and
Air Force OOS funded studies were utilized where appropriate. Various
component vendors were canvassed relative to their particular hardware.
In-house specialists who have experience in past and current Air Force
space programs in each of the major vehicle areas were utilized. From
these sources a data base was established from which a best estimate of the
cost to maintain the Tug was made.
B. GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
The first and most important assumption made in this study is that the
vehicle must be designed for ease of maintenance. All of the manpower esti-
mates are based on the assumption that components can be easily removed
and replaced in the vehicle. In addition, the vehicle should be built up of
major subsystem modules so that the vehicle can be readily disassembled
into its major subsystems as depicted in Figure 1.
8
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9
For the purpose of this study, it was assumed that all Tugs are suc-
cessfully launched by the Shuttle, complete their mission, and are success-
fully returned to the launch site by the Shuttle. In-flight Tug failures are
detected on board and a redundant component is used to successfully complete
the mission.
The Tug system includes built-in test equipment (BITE) to the compo-
nent level. Wiring and connector reliabilities are assumed to be part of the
component reliability.
The baseline vehicle is composed of components/assemblies such as
star trackers, computers, etc. These items are, by definition, the Line
Replaceable Units (LRU) and, if they fail in flight, the Checkout and Fault
Isolation (COFI) system, in conjunction with the Tug data management and
software systems, automatically switch in the redundant component/
assembly. When the Tug returns to the maintenance area, the failed or
indicated failed component/assembly is found by inspection, post-flight
tests, flight recorder data, etc., removed, replaced, checked out with
regard to its own system/subsystem and then verified by a post-maintenance
vehicle level test. The failed component is taken to the repair depot for
refurbishment and then returned to the maintenance storeroom. The repair
depot may be at the maintenance area or located off-site. For the purposes
of this study, it has been assumed that this repair is costed out at a certain
percentage of the unit cost, ranging from 15 percent to 60 percent depending
on the item. The actual manpower identified with this effort is only that
necessary for removal and replacement of the component on the vehicle.
Therefore, whether or not this repair is performed on- or off-site is
immaterial as far as this study is concerned. The actual tradeoffs to
determine whether this repair is done off-site or on-site should be the
subject of a subsequent study.
The previous paragraph implies the two assumptions that all indicated
failures result in component replacement prior to the next mission and that
the maintenance costs and rates reflect both real failures and false alarms.
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Another important assumption concerns the portion of the actual ground
turnaround operations considered to be part of Tug maintenance, i. e., that
portion which occurs after the Tug has been safed and unloaded from the
Shuttle and before the Tug is turned over for prelaunch operations as a
"new" vehicle. The operations considered for this study are those involved
with transporting the Tug to the maintenance area, analyzing the flight data,
performing the pre-maintenance vehicle level test, performing the actual
maintenance operations and then performing the post-maintenance vehicle
level test. At this point, the vehicle is considered to be a "new" vehicle
and the subsequent operations are charged to other functions. The vehicle
at this time may either be put in storage for later use or sent on to the
pre-launch activity area.
Only the manpower required to operate the ground equipment is consi-
dered in this study; the cost of the ground equipment itself is not addressed.
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V. BASIC DATA GENERATED AND SIGNIFICANT RESULTS
A. VEHICLE DESCRIPTION
The vehicle used for this study was synthesized from data obtained
from NASA and DOD funded Tug/OOS studies and Aerospace in-house efforts.
The vehicle is an integral propulsion stage utilizing liquid hydrogen and
liquid oxygen as propellants and is capable of operating either as a fully or
a partially autonomous vehicle. Structural features are an integral LH 2
tank (mounted forward), an LO 2 tank (mounted aft), a meteoroid shield, an
aft-conical docking and structural support ring, and a new staged combustion
main engine. The vehicle is constructed of major modules for ease of
maintenance.
B. REFURBISHMENT COST ESTIMATE
The baseline vehicle was divided into eleven major vehicle areas for
which refurbishment costs were generated. Table i shows the average
refurbishment cost per mission for each of these areas. Phase II and
Phase III in Table i refer to different phases of the flight program.
Phase II refers to the initial operational capability (IOC) portion of the flight
program which consists of the first 20 flights after the flight test pro-
gram. Phase III is the operational capability (OC) portion of the flight
program and the refurbishment costs associated with this phase are for a
mature vehicle. Scheduled refurbishment costs refer to the costs asso-
ciated with planned maintenance and replacement. Unscheduled refurbish-
ment costs refer to costs associated with random failures.
The average refurbishment cost for an initial operational vehicle (IOC)
is $429, 000 per flight as compared to $273, 000 per flight for a mature
vehicle (OC). The reduction in the average maintenance cost is due to a
reduction in the scheduled hardware replacements and detailed inspections
that are performed during IOC. The purpose of these detailed inspections
is to aid in developing and determining the reusability of the various
systems. In addition, the unscheduled maintenance costs in the OC phase
12
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represent a mature system whereas, in the IOC phase of the program, the
mean time between failure (MTBF) of the various systems is assumed to be
only half of its mature value for that system.
The scheduled maintenance costs represent the major portion of the
total refurbishment costs, except for the avionics system, where the
unscheduled maintenance costs are approximately 6 times higher than the
scheduled maintenance for a mature vehicle. This is due to the maintenance
philosophy assumed for the avionics system, i. e., nothing is replaced unless
it fails. This philosophy is possible for the the avionics system because the
system contains significant redundancies and essentially never wears out.
This type of philosophy is not feasible for a system like the propellant tank
insulation system or the main propulsion system where there are definite
wearout modes and the systems are not redundant.
Table 2 presents the refurbishment costs for IOC and OC as a per-
centage of the vehicle first unit production cost. The cost for IOC is 3. 91
percent and 2.49 percent for OC. These percentages are made up of five
main drivers. For OC, these are in order of importance: (1) the auxiliary
propulsion system, (2) the propellant tank insulation system, (3) the main
propulsion system, (4) the propellant tanks, and (5) the electrical power
system. In the IOC phase, the avionics system is more expensive to main-
tain than the electrical power system. This is a result of the relative imma-
turity of the system in the IOC phase of the program and the fact that almost
all the cost of maintaining the avionics system is due to unscheduled mainte-
nance. The major cost of maintaining the electrical power system is for
scheduled maintenance, which is about the same for both flight phases.
C. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF SELECTED TUG SYSTEMS
The results of this study are strongly dependent on the capability of
the Tug vehicle to be easily maintained and refurbished. Various assumptions
made during the course of the study can be related to design requirements
for many of the major vehicle areas. The first and most significant
14
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assumption made in this study was that the vehicle was designed to be main-
tained and refurbished. If the costs of maintaining a reusable vehicle like
the Tug are to be similar to the estimates made in this study, a design
requirement of maintainability and refurbishability must be imposed. This
requirement must be imposed at the very beginning of the design phase
rather than at some later date in the design as an afterthought. The vehicle
must be designed in such a way as to allow components that have limited life
and high maintenance requirements to be easily removed and replaced.
This must be done with a minimum amount of impact on the remainder of
the vehicle.
The results of this study point out the areas which have the greatest
effect on the cost of Tug refurbishment. The depth of this study does not
permit the identification of specific design requirements; however, this study
does identify general requirements that either are necessary if one is to
achieve the estimated refurbishment cost estimate or can be a significant
factor in reducing the refurbishment cost of the vehicle. The following para-
graphs address the five major cost drivers identified for the mature vehicle
and attempt to establish some general requirements relative to these systems.
Auxiliary Propulsion System
The auxiliary propulsion system has been identified as the most costly
Tug system to maintain. This is due primarily to the complexity and initial
cost of the system. The system has certain wearout modes which necessi-
tate the scheduling of replacement maintenance cycles. The ratio of man-
power costs to hardware costs for maintaining the system is approximately
13 percent. Therefore, any significant reduction of the cost of maintaining
the system must be accomplished via the hardware route. The auxiliary
propulsion system is assumed to have a life of 20 missions before major
overhaul. After 20 missions, the system is refurbished at a cost of 33
percent of the cost of a new system. The maintenance cost of the system
could be reduced by designing for a longer life, designing to a lower
16
refurbishment cost factor, or both. The design life of 20 missions was
assumed for this study. The 20 mission life capability of the main engine
was used as a guide for this assumption. The 33 percent refurbishment cost
factor used for the auxiliary propulsion system was determined by looking
at the operations involved and the disposition of the various components
removed during the refurbishment of the system.
Two design requirements are apparent for the auxiliary propulsion
system as a result of refurbishability and maintainability: (1) the system
must have a design life of 20 missions between major overhauls with a design
goal of 40 missions, and (2) at the end of the design life the system must be
refurbishable at a cost not to exceed 25 percent of the cost of a new unit with
a design goal of 15 percent.
Propellant Tank Insulation System
The second most costly item to maintain is the tank insulation system.
This is due to the state of development of the system. Currently, the reusa-
bility of the system has strong limitations and hence costly replacement and
repair maintenance cycles are scheduled. The cost of the maintenance of
this system is relatable to the design life of the system. The design require-
ment for the propellant tank insulation system should be that the system will
have a minimum design life of 20 missions before major overhaul with a
design goal of 100 missions.
Main Propulsion System
One of the requirements that has been defined for the main engine by
the Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory (AFRPL) is that it will have a
10 hour operational life before major overhaul. For the particular missions
defined for the Tug, this is equivalent to 20 missions. Also, analytical
studies performed by the various engine contractors have indicated that the
engine can be refurbished after 10 hours of operation for 25 percent of
the cost of a new unit.
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This refurbishment study has assumed that the main engine has a 20
mission capability after which it can be refurbished for 25 percent of the
cost of a new unit. The capability of a maximum refurbishment cost after
10 hours operation of 25 percent of the cost of a new engine should be made
a firm requirement.
Propellant Tanks
The propellant tank life for this study was assumed to be 20 missions
after which the tanks were replaced. This assumption results in two design
requirements: (i) the tank must be designed for a minimum life of 20 missions
with a design goal of 100; and (2) the vehicle must be designed for tank
replacement.
Electrical Power
The electrical power system was assumed to have a design life of
2000 hours after which it could be refurbished for 25 percent of the cost of
a new unit. The 2000 hour design life is a requirement for a currently
funded fuel cell technology study. The refurbishment cost factor of 25
percent is not. The design requirement for the electrical power system
resulting from the refurbishment study is that the system have the capability
of being refurbished at a minimum cost of 25 percent of a new unit after
2000 hours of operation. The design goal for refurbishment should be 15
percent.
18
VI. STUDY LIMITATIONS
The task of determining the cost of maintaining and refurbishing a
vehicle before that vehicle has been used is a difficult job. The problem
of determining these costs for a vehicle such as the Tug that is still in the
conceptual phase is even a more formidable one. Without detailed informa-
tion regarding the design of the various subsystems, any estimate of the
refurbishment costs would be mainly conjecture. To help circumvent this
problem, a baseline vehicle was synthesized from data obtained from NASA
and DOD funded Tug/OOS studies and Aerospace in-house efforts. Each
major vehicle system was described and the operations necessary for
maintenance of each of the systems were defined. The impact of multiple
reuse on the design and operation of spacecraft systems is not well under-
stood. In lieu of an existing data source directly applicable to Tug refur-
bishment, the experience that has been gained on past and current Air Force
space programs was utilized as the main source of information for this
study. Many of the systems and subsystems used on these programs, even
though they were not designed for reuse, are similar to those that are cur-
rently planned for Tug use. Various vendors and manufacturers whose
ideas were solicited in regard to the effect of multiple reuse and the cost of
refurbishment on their particular equipment were another important source
of data. Engineering judgment was used to synthesize these data into a
viable approach to Tug refurbishment.
The methods and philosophies used in the maintenance and refurbish-
ment of current reusable vehicles such as commercial and military aircraft
are a data base which could be utilized to establish some ideas for the
approach to Tug maintenance. However, the differences between these
types of vehicles and the Tug in their design and operating modes may not
permit a valid comparison of maintenance costs. No attempt was made to
compare the study results with the costs associated with maintaining and
refurbishing current reusable vehicles.
19
Vehicle maintenance cost is proportional to the time and effort
expended in checkout and testing of the vehicle systems during the post-
flight maintenance cycle. Definition of the test points and system self-
check capability is a prerequisite for determining the actual effort required
to ascertain system status; however, the state of the design of the Tug
systems, e.g., the checkout and fault isolation system, does not permit a
detailed assessment of the test points and self-check requirements. Hence,
some gross assumptions were necessarily made relative to the determina-
tion of vehicle status. It was assumed for this study that an on-board
checkout and switching system could be developed that could detect all
important failures and switch in the redundant component or subsystem.
The failure rate of the built-in test equipment (BITE) was assumed to be
10 percent of the total system. The relative complexity of the BITE system
and the system being tested was not assessed. No determination of the
failure detection probability was made; however, 25 percent was added to
all costs associated with random failures to account for false alarms. The
redundancy and reliability requirements of the redundancy switching system
were not addressed. The results of this study are predicated on the exis-
tence of such equipment for redundancy switching and minimizing the amount
of ground checkout required between flights. A separate study is needed to
define the system that accomplishes this function.
20
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
Several technology requirements have become apparent during the
course of the refurbishment study. The first of these pertains to the pro-
pellant tank insulation system. The multilayer insulation system is one of
the main refurbishment cost drivers mainly because of the unknowns involved
with its reuse capability. The current estimate of its reuse capability is
that it must be replaced every 5 missions due to deterioration under repeated
exposure to the ascent and reentry environment. The technology requirement
is to develop more test data on the insulation to gain a better understanding
of the effect of repeated exposure to the ascent and reentry environment.
This understanding should result in the development of an insulation system
that has a life expectancy of 20 missions or more.
The problem of testing the insulation system after each mission has
resulted in another technology requirement for the tank insulation system.
Multilayer insulation (MLI) must be located in a vacuum environment to per-
form properly. Generally, space provides the necessary vacuum to permit
MLI to perform thermally as it is intended to perform. At sea level condi-
tions, space-evacuated MLI will be filled with air or with a non-condensable
gas as a result of purging. In such a condition, the thermal protection
afforded by the insulation will be radically reduced. Because of the differ-
ence in MLI thermal performance at sea level and high vacuum conditions,
there presently is no method to verify MLI space performance without
subjecting it to a vacuum test. A method to circumvent this problem is
needed. The effort should be directed toward detecting the most common
failure modes of the insulation. These are insulation crushing, insulation
delamination, joint thermal shorts, etc. Techniques such as X-ray examina-
tion may be promising. If testing under ambient ground conditions turns
out to be an infeasible method, testing at a moderate vacuum should be
investigated.
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Several technology requirements have been identified for the success-
ful implementation of large, thin walled propellant tanks for the Tug vehicle.
The technology requirements encompass cyclic life considerations, methods
of leak checking, and fracture mechanics data characterization.
On the basis of demonstrated cyclic lives of a few hundred cycles for
current aerospace thin-walled tanks such as the Titan IIIC Transtage and the
Atlas/Centaur, it was concluded that the Tug 20 mission requirement could be
met with test and quality control standards similar to procedures used on
those programs. Since the Tug tankage is a different material than the
materials used on those programs, i. e., aluminum versus titanium
(Titan IIIC Transtage) and stainless steel (Atlas/Centaur), a technology
requirement is identified consisting of subscale, or full scale Tug tankage
subjected to cyclic pressure loading and monitored for leakage. The consi-
deration of tank life extension from 20 missions to 100 missions (200-1000
pressure cycles) also identifies a technology requirement for cyclic pressure
testing.
For the routine maintenance of the propellant tanks, a tank leak test
with helium was proposed. Although equipment is currently available for
such a test, it is necessary to establish a technology requirement to develop
small portable devices which could be used conveniently for tank checkout
between missions. In addition, the problems associated with detecting helium
leakage from tankage covered with thermal insulation should be investigated.
Pressure vessels often contain small flaws, or defects, that are
inherent in the materials, or introduced during the fabrication process.
These flaws may, in some cases, reduce the load-carrying capability and
operational life of the component from the levels predicted by conventional
methods of analysis. Fracture mechanics provides a methodology for eva-
luating the influence of flaws on pressure vessel performance and failure
mode. The application of this design method to the Tug tankage is severely
hampered by the lack of data for flaws in thin-walled tanks. Therefore, a
technology requirement is established for empirical data on pressure vessels
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with part-through thickness flaws subjected to cyclic pressure. The test
program should investigate the cycles to leakage of thin-walled propellant
tanks representative of the Tug vehicle due to initial part-through cracks.
The program should investigate several aluminum alloys appropriate for
cryogenic tankage, several parameters involving flaw geometry (i. e.,
depth-to-length ratios) and flaw depth-to-tank wall thickness, the influence
of temperature, and the influence of tank wall stress levels.
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VIII. SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT
A. VEHICLE STUDY
The Tug is basically a high performance vehicle that is very sensitive
to weight. Historically, vehicles designed for space application have been
designed for minimum weight and volume. This has resulted in the develop-
ment of highly complex mechanical and electrical packaging techniques. For
a reusable vehicle, such as the Tug, that must be maintained and refurbished
many times, this type of design philosophy is not appropriate. A new design
philosophy must be used which stresses ease of maintenance and accessibi-
lity to various systems. A vehicle study should be performed to assess the
feasibility of such a design philosophy. The vehicle would be designed with
the requirement that it be maintainable and refurbishable. Trade studies
should be performed to determine the effect on total program cost of varying
RDT&E costs and the resultant changes in maintenance and refurbishment
costs. The average cost per mission of maintaining this vehicle would then
be determined and its performance compared with a Tug that has been
designed for maximum performance without regard to maintenance.
B. CHECKOUT AND FAULT ISOLATION SYSTEM DEFINITION
The time consumed and the manpower involved in determining the
status of each system before and after each flight is dependent on the amount
of ground checkout required. The results of this study are based on the
existence of an on-board checkout and switching system that could detect
all important failures and switch in the redundant component or subsystem.
A study is needed to define the onboard checkout and fault isolation system
(COFI). The study should determine the best mix of on-board and ground
COFI and operational flight support. Several approaches and their impact
on the total vehicle should be examined. The failure rate of the built-in test
equipment and the redundancy and reliability requirements of the redundancy
switching system should be determined.
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C. TOTAL TUG TURNAROUND COSTS
The study reported herein is concerned with only one part of the total
Tug turnaround costs, viz., maintenance and refurbishment. Currently,
Tug turnaround costs are estimated using cost estimating relationships
(CERs) based on experience gained from past programs. A study is needed
to develop comprehensive estimates of the costs associated with Tug turn-
around from launch to launch based on an assessment of the operations
involved as they specifically apply to the Tug. All cost estimates should be
developed by assessing the functions, manpower and hardware necessary to
support each of the Tug turnaround operations.
D. TUG REFURBISHMENT LOGISTICS CONCEPTS
A study is needed to assess the various approaches to Tug logistics.
Various concepts concerning the approach to vehicle maintenance should be
identified. The question of who will perform the maintenance and the impact
on the total program should be addressed, e.g., private contractor versus
the use of a government organization to perform vehicle maintenance. The
impact on the funding level and the level of support required at the manu-
facturer for various approaches to spares support should be identified, i. e.,
all spares purchased at the beginning of the program or purchased over a
longer time span.
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APPENDIX A
STUDY 2.4 STATEMENT OF WORK
2.4 ANALYSIS OF SPACE TUG OPERATING TECHNIQUES
2.4. 1 Advanced Tug Program Analysis
The contractor shall define alternative Space Tug configura-
tions. For each, as approved by the Technical Director, the contractor
shall identify vehicle system implications and potential programmatic bene-
fits and penalties. Vehicle systems implications shall include vehicle design,
performance capabilities, and conduct of ground and orbital operations. The
contractor shall include analysis of the impact of the alternative programs on
DOD mission and program objectives. In addition, the contractor shall ana-
lyze the impact of DOD plans on NASA programs.
Task areas shall be identified by the contractor and when approved by the
Technical Director, in depth studies shall be conducted. Typical of the types
of studies are retrieval mechanisms and techniques, on-orbit stay time
requirements, ground and vehicle command and control techniques, defini-
tion of a Mark I and Mark II Tug subsystem technology, licensee considera-
tions, and assessment of technology requirements.
2. 4. 2 Tug Checkout, Maintenance, and Operational
Readiness Preparation
Background:
The contractor has, in support of prior DOD/NASA activity,
analyzed orbital checkout, maintenance, and operational readiness activities
applicable to candidate Space Tug configurations and will further develop
these activities. Vehicle-peculiar design requirements will be identified
and optimum levels of test maintenance and refurbishment recommended.
The study should consider diagnostics, maintenance and repair, assembly
and refurbishment, and checkout. In addition, the study will address the
requirements and techniques for on-orbit checkout of the Tug prior to
deployment.
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The objective of this task is to develop a better understanding of the refur-
bishment requirements and operating life for typical Space Tug concepts and
their constituent subsystems/components, and the relationship between
these factors and Tug design, weights, and costs. This set of information
will be used in examinations and selection of design approaches and operat-
ing approaches for the Space Tug.
The contractor shall provide:
(1) For a typical Space Tug or Orbit-to-Orbit Shuttle concept,
develop and compile detailed estimates for the following for each of the con-
stituent subsystems/components and for the composite Tug.
(a) The extent of servicing, adjustments, checks, and
replacements to be necessary following each flight.
(b) Major repairs and/or replacements that will be
necessary at regular intervals, or upon indication of performance reduction
or incipient failure.
(c) The operating life to be expected prior to reaching
the point that replacement of the Tug would be more practical or economi-
cally attractive, in lieu of continued refurbishing and overhaul.
(d) Man-hour and cost estimates for the preceding.
(Z2) Description of maintenance/refurbishment approach and
procedures upon which the preceding man-hour/cost estimates are based.
(3) As an extension of the foregoing analyses of a "typical" or
"baseline" Space Tug concept and configuration, the following should be
developed.
(a) Recommended design features or approaches for
Space Tug including consideration of associated ground equipment which would
reduce or minimize Tug refurbish/overhaul requirements.
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(b) The approximate relationships between refurbish/
overhaul requirements and Space Tug design, weights, and development/
unit costs, where the Tug design or development is varied to achieve a
different refurbishment overhaul level.
(c) The effect of the baseline refurbish/overhaul/life
estimates upon total Tug program costs, and the sensitivity of operating
and program costs to variations in these estimates.
The basic approach for this study and the major assumptions to be used
should be reviewed by the Technical Director.
2. 4. 3 Future Requirements
New requirements brought about by reusability as a stan-
dard mode of operation shall be identified and recommendations for future
studies shall be made. Examples include (a) technology improvements
needed to assure sufficient on-orbit capabilities, (b) demonstration or veri-
fication experiments for application to Skylab or early Space Shuttle missions,
and (c) study the tradeoff considerations of the Tug and Shuttle interface
considering requirements imposed on the Shuttle or Tug, as compared to
providing a separate interfacing module to be used on Shuttle flights
requiring a Tug.
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